University of Oklahoma College of Law

University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons
American Indian and Alaskan Native Documents in the Congressional Serial Set: 1817-1899
3-22-1886

Forfeited grants Northern Pacific Railroad.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/indianserialset
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
H.R. Rep. No. 1226, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886)

This House Report is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in American Indian and Alaskan Native Documents in the
Congressional Serial Set: 1817-1899 by an authorized administrator of University of Oklahoma College of Law
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact Law-LibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

49TH CoNGREss,}

HOOSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

REPORT
{

lst Session.

No.1226.

FOHFEirED GRANTS NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD.

MARCH

Mr.

22,

18~6.-Referred

HENLEY,

to the Honse Calendar and ordered to be printed.
JUNE 17, 1886.-0rdered to be reprinted.

from the Committee on the Public Lands, submitted the
following

REPORT·
[To accompany bill H. R. 147.]

The Oorn'mittee on the Public Lands, to u·hom were referred sundry bills for
the fotfeiture of the land gTant to the N oTthern Pacific Railroad Company~ sub'mit the following report :

Your committee hereby adopt as their report the report of the Public
Lands Committee made to the House of Representatives in the Fortyeighth Congress. Tile legal status remains the same, and your committee therefore have concluded to present that report, as it stands, as
their report to this Congress :
[House Report.No. 1256, Forty·ei~hth Congress, first session.]

The Committee on the Public Lands, to whom were referred sundry bills for the
forfeiture of the land grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, submit the
following rel>ort:
Your committee have given the sul)ject-matter of this grant patient, careful, and
thorough consifleration. They are satisfied that the grant was one in prresenti upon
<Jondition subsequent; that by breach of such condition the grant, along the entire line
so far as it was uncomplete<l on the 4th day of .Jnly, 1879, is, and has been since said
date, subject to forfeiture, and that, justice to the United States and her citizens now
require that a forfeiture and restoration of the lands to the public domain shoald be
declared by act of Congress. To accomplish that result and at the same time protect
purchasers of the company's t•tle prior to January 1, 1884, and actual settlers and
owners of valuable improvements on the odd sections adjacent to the uncompleted
portions of said road who settled or made said improvements with bona fide intent to
secure title through the company, your committee have prepared a substitute for said
bills, and herewith report the same to the House and recommend it~ passage.
In view of the fact thnt the conclusion to which your committee have arrived was
earnef!tly combatted by learned counsel in elaborate argument and brieii;, we deem it
proper to 1efer tiOmewl!at minutPly and in detail to what we consider the most material points of the case, especia1ly as it was nrgP<1 that the grant to this company
was in certain features an exception from the otherwise unbroken line of forfeitable
grants, an isolated example of unparalleled generosity ou the part of the United
States in giving away millions of acre:s of the public domain without any provi:sion
for resuming its titl<' even upon absolute failnre of the company to fulfill its part of
the contract. That such a construction in effect of the granting act was not only
seriously but earnestly and forcibly urged by learned and distinguished counsel for
the company, is the apology of your cnmmittee for what might otherwise be deemed
an unnecessary elaboration of the :subject under consideration.
The act of Congress containing the grant to this company was approved July2, 1864
(13 Statutes, 365), and the graut itself was in extent the most munificent of all the
pr~ncel.Y d011at~ons made in the ~ra C!flil;>eralityto aid in the cons~ruc.tion of railroads,
bemg for 20 mtles along the enttre hue m all the States, and 40 miles mall the Territo-
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ries through which the line might he located, with the right of indemnity selection
within 10 additional miles, afterward by subsequent act (16 Stat., 2i8) enlarged to 2()
miles, for all lands lost. in the grant in place.
The land affected by the grant and subject to its operation was in fact all odd-numbered sections in a belt of the public domain extending over 2,000 miles, from Lake
Superior to Puget Sound, 40 miles in width in all the States and 80 miles in wid.th in
all the Territories through which the linP should be located.
The consideration of this munificent grant, as specifically declared ·by the act itself,
was ''to secure the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of
war, and pub1ic storPs" over said railway (section 3), "to promote the public interest
and welfare by the construction of said railroad. aud telegraph line," to keev "the
same in working order," and ''to secure to the Government at all times, but particularly in time of war, the use and benefits of the same for postal, military, and other
purposes." (Section 20.)
Section 3 of the act embracing the grant of lands was in the following words:
"SEC. 3. And be it j1u·ther enacted, That there be and is hereby granted to the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company, its successors and assigns, for t.he purpose of aiding in the
construction of said railroad and telegraph line to the Pacific coast, and to secnre the
safe and speedy transportatioi! oftbe mails, troops, munitionsofwa.r, and pnblic stores,
overtherouteof sai<lline of railway, every alternate section of public land, not mineral,
designated by odd numbers, to the amount of twenty alternate sections per mile, on
each side of said railroad line, as said company ma.y adopt, through the Territories of
the United States and ten alternate sections of land per mile, on each side of said railroad, whenever it passes through any State, and whenever, on the line thereof the
United States have full title, not reserYed, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated,
and free from pre-emption or other claims or rights at the time the line of said road is
definitely fixed and the plat thereof filed in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office; and whenever, prior to said term, any of said sections or parts of sections shall have been granted, sold. reiierved, occupied by homestead settlers, or preempted, or otherwise disposed of, other lands shall he st~lected by said company in lieu
thereof, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, in alternate sections and
designated by odd numbers, not more than 10 miles besond the limits of said alternate sections."
Section 5 of the act was in the following words:
"SEC. 5. That the said Northern Pacific Railroad shall be constructed in a substantial and workmanlike manner, with all the necessa.ry draws, culverts, bridges, viaducts, crossings, turuouts, stations, and watering places and all other appurtenances,
inclnding furniture and rolling stock, equal iu all respects to railroads of the first class,
when preparerl. for business, with rails of the best qua.Jity, manufactnr<'d from American iron. A.nd a uniform gauge shall be established throughout the entire length of
the road. A.ud there shall be constructed a telegraph line of the most substantial
and approved description, to be operated along the entire line: P1·orided, That said
company shall not charge the Government higher rates than they do individuals for
like transportation and telegraph service. A.nd it shall be the duty of the Northern
Pacific Railroad Company to permit any other railroad which shall be authorized to
be built by the Unitet.l States or by the legislature of any Territory or State in which
the same may be situated, to form running connections with it, on fair and equitable
terms."
Section 8 of said act was in the following words :
"SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That each and every grant, right, and privilege
herein are so made and given to and accepted by said Northern Pacific Railroad Company, upon and subject to the following conditions, namely: That the sa.id company
shall commence the work on said road within two years from the approval of this act
by the President, and shall complete not less tllan 50 miles per year after the second
year, and shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete tLe whole road by the 4th clay
of Jniy, A.. D. 1876."
Section 9 of the a<lt was in the following wo·rds :
"SEC. 9. Ancl be itj'l11·ther enacted, That the United States make the several conc1itioned grants herein and that the said Northern Pacific Railroad Company accept the
same upon the further conclition, that if the company make any breach of the conditions hereof and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year, then in such case,
at any time hereafter, the United States, by its Congress, may do any and all acts and
things, which may be needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of said
road."
The period fixed by the eighth section of the granting act above quoted within which
the road was required to be completed was snbsequeutly extended to the 4th day of
July, 1879, as appears from the following facts: The joint resolution of May 7, 1866
(14 Stat., :355), extended the time two years, and the joint resolution of July 1, 1tl68 (15
St.at., 255 ), amended section 8, the original granting act, so as to read July 4, 1877. On
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June 11, 1879 (General Laud Office Report, 1879, pp.109-111 ), the Secretary of the Interior held that the effect of these two joint resolutions was to extend tile time to July
4, lb79. In this view your committee concur, and we adopt that date as the expiration
of the period of limitation.
The total length of the line as located and proposed, including the Washington Territory Branch, was 2,~70 miles. Prior to JnlJ" 4, 187H, there had been complete,l531 miles
of road, leaving 1, ng miles uncompleted at the expiration of the time limited. (See
report of Secretary of the Interior to Forty-seventh Congress, Ex. Doc. No.144, p. 41.)
In round numbers and estimated, 10,675,200 acres are by the bill reported conceded to
the compauy, and 27,53!.1,840 acres subjected to forfeiture.
The consideration of the case involves two general and leading questions: First, the
power of Cougress to declare a grant of public lands forfeited for breach of condition
subsequent; second, whether, this power being established, there are any features in
this particular case excepting the grant from the general rule.
The pow·er of Congress to declare forfeit(.'d a grant of the public lands, made to either
a corporation or a State, b.v an act containing a clause providing that the lands should
revert. upon failure to build the road within a specified time, is established beyond all
controversy by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court.
It is specifically so held in United States t•s. Repentigny (5 Wall., 211) and Schulenburg VB. Harriman (21 \Vall., 44).
Following these cases is another which even more unequivocally defines the power of
Congress in this regard. In Farnsworth VB. Minnesota aud Pacific Railroad Company
(92 U.S., 66), the court, considering the question, said:
"A forfeitnre by the State of an interest in lands and connected franchises, granted
for tile constrnct1on of a public work, may be declared for non-compliance with the
conditions annexed to their grant or their possession, when forfeiture is provided by
statute, without judicial prooecdings to ascertain and determine the failure of. the
grantee to perform the conditions."
Following these authoritative expositions of the law, as well as the reasons and
sense of the principle involved, your committee have uniformly held that jurisdiction
existed in C:ongress to declare these grants forfeited and have reported several bills to
accomplish that purpose some of which have already passed the House. We adhere
to this position in the case nuder consideration.
Your committee are also clearly of the opinion that there is nothing in the provision~
of the Northern Pacific act which tal,es it out of the category of grants upon condition
subsequent, liable to forfeiture for breach of condition.
.
The question turns upon a consideration of sections 3, 5, 81 and 9, hereinbefore quoted.
The company claim that they constitute an absolute dedication of the lands to the
purpose of constructing the road; that there is no condition subeeqnent whatever,
and that the only power iu the United States is tho power through Congress to adopt
such measures as may be necessary to insure the completion of the road, in case the
company does not build it.
On the other hand, your committee regard this construction as utterly untenable,
and are clearly of the opinion1. That section 8 of the act declares a condition subsequent, viz, t-hat the road shall
be completed within a certain time, upon breach ofwhich the grantor may declare a
forfeiture.
2. That section Y is in no wa.y repugnant to section 8, but while embracing all that
is included therein, and to that extent perhaps cumulative, is also, in connection with
section fi, a declaration of further and additional conditions &ubsequent, for breach of
which Congress may interfere to protect the rigilts of the United States.
~- That under either of sai(l sections, or both together, the United States, by Congress, bas the right to declare the grant for.feited for failure to build the road within
the limitation.

I.
Section 8 is perfectly plain in the language used and the purpose contemplated. It
declares in so many words that the grant made is given by the United States and accepted by the company "subject to the following conditions, namely, that the said
company " " * shall construct, equip, furnish, and complete the whole road," &c.
This is too plain for any construction. Congress intended to provide, and did provide,
that the road\.should be completed within a certain time, and that that should be a
condition of the grant. If a condition, the gnnt is determinable upon its breach, at
the option of the grantor.
The argument of the company rests n pon the absence of express words declaring areversion in case of the breach. That, in the judgment of your committee, was entirely
unnecessary in order to create an estate upon condition subsequent. The estate, so conditioned, is created by declaring the condition, not by declaring the result of its
breach. The latter, re-entr.v or its equivalent, follows as a matter of legal effect.
Every lawyer knows the result of a breach of condition subsequent, and the statement
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of that result in any grant ad1ls nothing to the preYions cl<'scription of the estate cre:.t<'rl. The land does "reYert '' b~' operation of htw upon the breach lJtjing er!forced by
re-ent1y or its eqniYalent; bnt the nght to that re-entry dt>peud::; upon no express
1n·ovisions tllat the Jau<.l :shall revert. It stands upon the condition declared al_ld its
breach. Upon thi:s poiut \Ye quote from the report of the Public Lands Committee,
made at this sessioll of Congre~:>:s upon the l..Jill forfeiting the Texa::; Pacific land grant,
rt'ported to tbe House by Judge Pa~·son:
"In otber \Yords, generally stated, the distinguisbed counsel for the company declares that in la·w the power to declare a forfeiture of a grant made ou condition subsequent for l..Jreach of the condition must l..Je reserved to the grantor by express terms
in the act of making tlte grant, or it does not exist.
"No authority was lJroduced to the corumittee except the statement of the attorneys a 'Serting this extraordinary doctrine in support of it; but the interest being so
.great, we have examined the books on the question, and are not able to find a single
authority in support of the proposition, an1l we believe none can l..Je found.
"On the contrary, '"\Vasbbnru on Real Property (vol. 2, 3d ed., p. 15) asserts the rule
to he: ' Where the condition of a grant is express t,here is no ueed of reserving a right
of entry of a breach therrof in order to enable tbc grantor to avail himself of 1t.' See
also JackROll VB. Allen, 3 Cowan, 2:W; Gray vs. Blanchard, t; Pick., 284; Littleton, sec.
331.
"[ndeed, all the decided cases we can find, as well M the text-books, are in harmony
and to the sawe effect; so we do not present argument upon jt here."
The estate is created by proper words of description declarillg the condition, and the
legal efi'ect of what follows the breach is exactly the sa,me whether it be descril.Jed in
the grant or not. Thus in the case under cou:;ideration the estate upon condition is
created by the specific language u~:>ed. The )(•gal effect of reversion follows the breach
and declaration of forfeiture. No p1·ovision that the land should revert was necessary, and if added would simply bave described the legal result of what preceded it.
The Touchstone, page 122, tl:lus describes the operative words creating an estate on
condition:
"Uonditions aunexed to estatt>s are sometimes so placed and confoumled among covenants, sop:1etimes so ambiguously drawn, aud at all timE's have in their drawing so
much affinity with limitatwns, that it is bard to discern ancl distinguish them. Know,
therefore, for the most part, conditions ha\'e conditioual words in their frontispiece,
. and do begin therewith , and that among these words there are three words that are
most proper, which in their own natnre and efficacy, without any addition of other
words of re-~>ntr~· in the conclusion of the conclition, do make the estate conditional,
as proviso, ita quod and sub conditione.''
Washburn, in his work on Real Property, marginal page 42, says:
'' AHwng the forms of expression which imply a condition iu a grant the writers
give the following: •On condition,' 'provided always,'' if it shall so happen,' or 'so
that the grantee pay, &c., within a specified time,' and grants made upon any of these
terms vest a conditional estate in the gTantee."
·when the condition of a grant is express, there is no nece sity of reserving a right of
entry for breach of the condition, in order to enable the grantor to take advantage of it.
(Jackson' vs. Allen, 3 Cow., 220; Gray tJB. Blanchan1, 8 Pick., 284.)
That the words" upon condition," and even words les~; specifically expressing tbe intent, are construed as establishing an estate upon condition sn bseq nent, without further
description, is bhown by many authorities. (Litt~eton, pp. 228, ~W.I, :~30, Com. Dig.
Condition A 2; 2 Wood, Com. Powell's ed., 505, 512, et seq.; Wheeler t•s. Walker, 2
Conn., 201; Thomas -vs. Record, 477 Me., 500; Sharon Iron Co. 1'8. Briu, 41 Penn. St.
341; Taylor vs. Cedar Rapid R. R. Co., 25 Iowa, 371; Attorney-Genemlvs. Merrimack
Co., 14 Gray, 612; Hadley VB. Hadley, 4 Gray, 145; Rawson VB. School District, 7 Allen,
128; Caw. vs. Robertson, 1 Selden, 1~5; Pickle t•s. McKissick, 21 Penn. St. 232; Hooper
vs. Cummings, 45 Me., 359; Chapin VB. School, 35 N. II., 450; Wiggin vs. Berry, 2
Foster, 114; Hayden vs. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 534; Wright vs. Tuttle, 4 Day, 32().)
Authorities upon this point might be multiplied. It is tho construction of principle
and authority, and your committee have been referred to uo case which in their judgment milita,tes at all against tbe position here assumed. Tho Touchstone, at page 122,
immediately following the quotation which we have made~ if:l suggested as modifying the
authorityofthe citation in its applicability to the case under consideration. .But nosnch
effect can possibly be given the lang11age used. After :statmg the broad proposition
q noted, the writer proceeds to say that although the words mentioned are "the most
proper words to make conditions," yet that they are sometimes used for other purposes.
He then points out instances where the word "proviso" in certain particular relations
may be given a different meaning. But the entire discussion is limited to that particular word-does not once mention the words "Bnb conditione" or name a single instance where they are used in a sense contrary to the general rule, and even in respect to the word "proviso " the exception could not apply to the case under consicl-
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era tion, for it is ex pre sly limited to a use of the wonl where it does not stand '' originally, by and of itself."
The other authorities to which we have been referred are not ,in any sense repugnant to the view of the law we adopt. They are few in numbers, and at the best
simply hold that these apt words may, in certain instance~, be restricted by immediate reference to other portions of the deed clearl.v expressing a different intent in the
grantor. That this is true is not denied; but it does not change the general rule, and
its applicability to the case under consideration will more properly be noticed hereafter.
\Ve are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that section 8 of the act, by the express
language used, created an estate upon condition subsequent, forfeitable upon breach
of the condition.

II.
Section 9 of the act, while perhaps embracing the preceding section within its provisions, and possibly to that extent cumulative., is also a provision prescribing certain
other and additional conditions subsequent.
It will be noticed at the outset that by its specific language it embraces more than
one grant, th@ exact words being "the several conditioned grants herein," an(l that it
relates to a "fnt"t.her" condition. The "further" condition was that if the company
should make any breach of "the conditions hereof" and the same should continue
for a :vear, theu the United St~tes might, &c. Now, jt is obvions npon the mere rearling that this lauguag·e tloe~-; not primarily relate to section B, for that ~-;ectiou onl~- appertai us to one grant, needs no "further" condition, a,ud tlle [HOVlsion tha,t tlw tleliwlt
shonltl continne for a year or upwards would lHtYe no pertinence. This section evidentlv relates to some otlwr condition tha,n tha.t mentioned in sectinn tl.
Th~se othe_r conditions or 1·eqnirf'mf'nt:; are fonnfl in section 5, which provides that
six separate and dist inet tiling-~-; should be <lone by the company, YlZ: 1st, that tlle roatl
shonld bo constrncte<l in a suiJstantial and workmanlike manner, equal iu allre~-;pects
to first- cla!'is rallroa<l; 2<1, tba.t it shonld he ma<le of rnils of the best qnality, mannfactnred from American iron; 3d, that a nniforrn gauge shoul<l be established throughout the entire line; 4t,h, that the company should constrnct a telegraph line of the
most approved and sullstantial description; 5th, that it should not charge the Go,·ernment higher rates than individuals, and, 6'th, that it sbonltl permit other railroa<l~
to make running connections on fair and reasonable terms. TheRe are the other an<l
further conditions meutione<l by section 9, in default of any of which, continuing for
a ~'ear, Congress should have the right to "do any and all acts and things" to secure
the "speedy completion of the said road," as contemplated and provided.
The intent of Congress, expressed with abundant precision in the act itself, and as
eYery one knows, as a matter ufhistory, was to iusure the coustruction witlun the time
prescribed of a substantial, first-class, and throughly-eqnipped railroad from Lake Superior to the Pacific, suitable and available in all emergencies for uso by the United
States-in peace for the transmission of its mails; in war for the carrying of troops and
supplies. Congress did not donate 48,000,000 acres of the puiJlic domaiu to this company
without expecting and requiring some equivalent. Among t.he tbiugs it did require wa::1
the construction of a first-class road for the purposes and in tlle manner indicated. It
accordingly prescribed the various req nirements above recited, and to insnre obedience
to its mandates it providerl by section 9 that in default of any of the same Congress
might do anything necessary to complete the road in the manner contemplated and
prescribed. The enactment of these provisions would have been futile had uo reservation been made of a right to enforce them. \Vithout such a resen-ation the Government, npon default of the company, ~onld have had nothing left except a cla.im
a::;!"ainst the company for breach of con't.ract or of coYenant. To prevent snch a condition of a.ffairs the right was reserved to further legislate to compel obedience to its
mandates. These requirements then became additional conditions snllsequeut which
Congress could enforce by forfeitnre or l.iy any other remedy deemed appropriate and
adeqnate. That was the object, scope, and intent of section 9, and it is expressed in
unam hignons phrase.
It hl no answer to this proposition to say that these requirements might be ~nforced
by the general forfeiture provided by section .
The road might have b<>en llnilt within the time limitecl, and yet eYery one ot' these
conditionR been broken. The grant could not then have b<>en forfeitecl at all nncler Rection tl. A road would ha.ve heen completed, aurl though hnilt in ah<;olnte disregard of
all the reqULremerHs of section 5, the Government wonl<l have lJeen pnwerleH'> either to
resume the grant or compel the cotnpany to perform the condition. That s~dion 9 relatE's to other conditions than that me1otion<><l in section 8 is also apparent from tbe
use of the words" and allow the same to continue for upwards of one year." These
words, if applied to the condi tious mentionecl in section 5, mean something. If applied to section they are nonsensical. If Congress had intended to ex. tend the period
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mentioned in section 8 one year, it would have said July 4, 1877; not July 4, 1876r
and another year thereafter.
It is thus apparent that section 9 of the act has a scope and effect far beyond anything embraced by section 8; that it legislated upon fnrther and additional subjects;
bas a separate and distinct function of its own, and that instead of limiting or controlling the precedwg section it creates additional obligations and liability on the
part of the company.
The only answer to this position advanced by the company is the suggestion that
if this be trne~ then the two sections are utterly inconsistent with each other. It is
difficult to understand how this can be seriously urged. We have already sbown a
different legal scope and operation for each under the construction we have adopted.
They are not repugnant or inconsistent in the slightest degree. Each stands for its
own particular purpose. On the other hand, the construction contended for by the
company would violate well-established rules of construction simply to disregard the
plainly expressed intent of Congress. They cla1m that the two sections should be
taken together, and that so taken all that Congress could do upon failure of the company to build the road would be to take all necessary steps to compel its completion,
without power to forfeit the grant.
This position is untenable under the rules of construction because, first, it assumes
au ambiguity, and then to reconcile it rejects the usual and ordinary signification of
terms and phrases; twice reads as singular a word in the plural, and construes
"further condition" as if the word" further" was omitted; second, with reference to
a simple time condition, viz, that the road should be built by Jnly 4, 1876, it adds the
senseless expression, ''provided the same shall continue unbuilt one year;" third, it
excludes all of section 3 from its relations and connect.ions with section 9, and either
1·ejects it entirely or makes it practically inoperative; fourth, it violates the manifest
general intent of the entire act and the general policy of Congress prevailing at the
time in respect to these grants.
Another oonsideration is to be noticed. The provision of section 9 is permissive or
directory only. Congress may do all necessary things, &c. It is not mandatory, as
it would have been if intended as the sole remedy for the breach of the condition of
section 8. So, too, it is not exclusive of other remedies for the breach. Congress
may in that way enforce the forfeiture or may do it otherwise.
We have been referred to some authorities which are supposed to sustain the forced
construction of the act contended for, but after the most careful examination of them
we are unable to recogpize any doctrine contrary to that we have adopted for our
guidance. The strongest cited are undoubtedly the cases of the Episcopal Mission vs.
Appleton et al. (17 Mass., 326) and Stanley vs. Colt (5 Wall., 119). They do not establish any new doctrine or any principle repugnant to the authority of the long line of
cases we have cited.
In the former, the supreme court of Massachusetts, speaking of a voluntary deed
for charitable purposes, say:
"Although the words' upon condition' in a conveyance of real estate are apt words
to create a condition, any breach of which will forfeit the estate, yet they are not to
be allowed that effect when the intention of the grantor, as manifested by the whole
deed, is otherwise."
And in the latter, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking of a devise for
certain. charitable purposes, say:
''It is true the word 'proviso' is an appropriate one to constitute a common-law
Mndition in a deed or will; but this is not the fixed and invariable meaning attached to it by the law in these instrnments. On the contrary, it gi\·es way too the
intent of the parties as gathered from an examination of the whole instrument, &c."
The principle announced by these rl<'cisionA is simply the universal rule of construction giving effect to the real intent of the parties to an instrument when the same can
be fairly ascertained from the language used. In other words, that technical expressions and phrases ordinarily yield to a contrary plainly expressed intent. Bnt the principlfl has no applicability to the case under consideration, for there it-> no intent, either
expressed or to l.>e reasonably implied, contrary to the technical meaning of the woros,
"upon condition." On the contrary, the act from beginning to end displays in every line
a most deliberate, well considered, anti matured intention not to l.>estow this princely
gift without so circnlllscril.>ing and limiting the company by these conditions as to secure
the ol.>ject, and every object, which Congress had in view. It shows the clearest intention in the mind of Congress to create a condition subsequent forfeiting the grant for
failure to build the road within the prescriLed period; aud also other condltions-subsequeut, put:ing it in the power of Congress, even after the road had been built, to
enforct' the requirements of the act touching the manner of its construction. In the
judgment of your committee there is not a word in the act indicative of an intent to
limit or curtail the teclmical words of condition used.
And aside from the language of the act itself, it is incredible that Congress conld
bave intended in this, probably the largest and most valuable grant of lands ever
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made to a railroad company or a State, to depart from the uniform and uninterrupted
policy of legislation for years, and allow the company to appropriate this vast belt of
the public domain without restriction, reservation, or control. Your committee cannot subscribe to such a doctrine and can find .no argument, even plausible, to support
it. We are clearly of opinion that Congress intended to provide for a forfeiture upon
failure to build the road within the prescribed period, and that the language used was
~bundantly sufficient in law to accomplish that intent.

III.
Your committee are also well satisfied that even under section 9 of the act, in the
sense in which it is construed by the company, Congress had and has the power to
declare a forfeiture. It is concedeq that under it Congress can do any and all acts
and things needful and necessary to insure a speedy completion of the road. Congress is the sole and exclusive judge of whether the road has at any time, in point of
fact, been completed; and if not, what remedy should be applied. Tbe remedy of
iorfeiture is included within the general power reserved. The road is in fact uncompleted to this <lay. Congress can now, by virtue of that very reservation, so strenuously insisted upon by the company as protecting the grant, declare the same forfeited and restored to the public domain. Might not the forfeiture of the grant in
thelhands of this company and the consequent creation of an open field for equal
competition best conduce to the speedy, ultimate completion of the entire line¥ If
Congress so view the matter, there can be no doubt of its power to declare the forfeitnre under tbe very clause of the act relied upon by the company for its protection.
OTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE FORFEITURE CONSIDERED,

Certain other considerations have been presented to your committee, as objections
to declaring a forfeiture, which we deem it proper to notice.
First. It is argued that Congress having by the joint resolution of May 31, 1H70 (16
Stat., 378), authorized the company to issue bonds and execute a mortgage upon its
property and franchises, cannot now do au act by which the interests of the bondholders, or others claiming under the mortgage, will be injuriously affected.
The argument is plausible, but not sound. It is correct in theory, but fallacious as
applied to the facts of the case under consideration. It rests upon the false assumption
that Congress authorizedamortgage oftheunconditionalfee, whereas it did nothing of
the kiud. It permitted a mortgage of "the property and rights of property of all
kinds and descriptions'' of the company.
The property and rights of property belonging to the company, so far as its lands
were concerned, was not the absolute, unc0nditional fee. lt was the fee charged with
the condition subsequent. Tbat was the estate, and the only estate, which the company ownt>d, or which it was a-uthorized to ~ortgage. The mortgagee took the estate, as it was, chargeu with the condition. If no breach occurred the estate became
absolute; upon breach the forfeiture could be enforced against the mortgagee as well
as the mortgagor. Congress, by the joint resolution, diu not enlarge the grant; it
simply gave its assent to a mortgage of the grant as it stood.
The mortgagee took with his eyes open; receivecl a defeasible estate, the character
of which be is presumed to have known; and be simply stands in his grantor's shoes
as respects the question of forfeiture. This is well settled.
In Touchstone, at page 120, it is thus tersely stated:
''And if he that bath the estate grant or charge it, it will be subject to the condition
Rtill; for the condition doth always atteml and wart upon the estate or thing whel'eunto it is annexed; so that a1thongh the same do pass through the hands of au hundred men, yet it is subject to the couuition still."
And again, at page 154 :
"It is gt'nerally true that he that doth enter for a condition broken doth make the
estate void ab initio, and that be shall be in of his first estate in the same courtJe and
manner as it was when he departed with the possession and at the time of the making
of the condition. And hence it is that, if there be any charge or encumbrance on the
lauds, as if the lessee of land upon condition grant a rent charge out of the land or enter
into a statute or recognizance and the con usee has the land in execution and this charge
is after the condition is made, in this case when the condition is uroken and the party
doth re-enter he shall by relation avoid the rent, statute, and recognizance and hold
the land freed from them all."
Greenleaf's Cruise on Real Property (vol. 2, pp. 44, 5:l) thus refers to the question:
'·Where a person enters for a condition broken the estate becomes void, ab initio;
the person who enters is again scizeu of his original estate in the same manner as if
he had never coll\·eyed it away. Auu as the entry of the ft·offer on the feoffee for a
condition broken uefeats the estate to which the condition was annexed, so it defeats
all nghts and incidents annexed to that estatt>, together with all charges aud incum-
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brances created by the feoffee during his possession; for upon the entry of the feoffer
he becomes seized of an estate paramount to that '?thich was subject to these charges.''
Washburn on Real Property (vol. 2, p.ll, marginal page 451) says:
''When such entry had been made the effect was t.o reduce the estate to the same
plight, and to cause it to be held in the same terms as if the estate to which the condition was annexed had not beeu granted.''
And Kent thus states the same principle (vol. 4, p. 125):
"Persons who have an estate or freehold subject to a condition are seized and may
convey, though the estate will continue defeasible until the condition be performed
or release, or is barred by the statute of limitation or by estoppel."
In Foxcroft vs. Mallet ( 4 How., 377) the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking directly upon this very quest10n, arising upon a mortgage of an estate upon condition subsequent, say:
.
"The condition, or charge, was on the land as an incumbrance by the very terms of
the deed to him, and he could not, if he tried, convey a title to the land which should
be free from it. Such a condition attaches to the land wherever it goes, although the
same should pass through a hundred bands. In our view, it operates like a covenant which runs with the land, and aU assignees are bound by covenants real that
run with the land."
So, in the case under consideration, the mortgagee took only tbe title of the mortgagor, charged with its defeasible quality. In the language of the Supreme Court~
the mortgagor could uot, if he tried, convey a title to the land which would be free
from the charge.
The bondholders and others claiming under the mortgage simply stand in the shoes
of the company. They could not and did not take any greater or Letter estate than
their grantor held, and that was an estate subject to forfeiture for condition broken.
We have been furnished with no authorities containing a contrary view of tbi~
question, and we believe 1 hat none exist. In fact, the '''bole argument of the counsel
for the company upon this point rests, as before stated, npou the erroneous assumption that Congress in some way, by the joint resolution referred to, enlarged the
estate of the company, or authorized them to mortgage a greater estate than they
theretofore possessed. Ab no foundation for such an assumption can l>e found, either
expressed or implied, in the joint resolution in qnestiou, it follows that the parties are
relegated to their rights as defined by the au1Jhorities we have cited, which are al>solut~ly conclusive of the whole controversy.
Second. It is said that Congress should not now declare a forfeiture because the
United States, as is alleged, did not sea~onahly comply with what is deemed a requirement of section 2 of the granting act relative to t.he extinguishment of Indian titles.
The pertinent portion of that section is· in the followiug words:
"The United States shall extinguish as rapidly as may be consistfont with public
policy and the welfare oft be said Indians~ the Indian titles to all lands falling under the
·operation of this act and acquired in the donation to the road named in this bill."
The Indian lands in respect to which this complaint against the Govern went is
raised are a tract lying between the Red RiYer of the North and the James River in
Dakota; the Sioux Reservation in Dakota; the Crow Reservation in Montana; the
Camr d'Alene Reservation in Idaho; and the Yakima and Puyallup Reservations in
Washington Territory.
It i.s claimed that the provision of section 2, above quoted, required the United States
to extinguish the Indian title to these tracts, and that l>ecause this, as is alleged, was
not seasonably done, the company is released from the condition su bseq uen t. To support this claim is cited the well-recognized rule that if. the ,Performance of a condition
subsequent is rendered impossible by act of the grantor it becomes void.
It will be observed that the provision of law quoted applies only to lands "falling
under the operation of the act and acquired in the donation t.o the road named in
this bill." None of the tracts named were acquired in the donation unless perhaps it
be the first one ment.ioned. By section 3 there are excepted from the grant all lands
"reserved, sold, granted, or otherwise appropriated," at the time the line of the road
was definitely fixed and a plat thereof filed in the General Land Office. The earliest
definite location of any portion of the road was in November, l87l(Report of Commissioner of the General Land Office, 1873, p. 301). This was forthatportionof the road
lying in Minnesota. The balance of the line has been definitely located since, at different dates.
With reference to the first tract mentioned, viz, the laud lying between the Red
River of the North and the James River in Dakota, it is admitted by t,he company and
the records show that the road was completed through these lands within the time prescribed. The proposed forfeiture does not affect them, and it is of course obvious thatt
if they fell within the terms of the granting act, the Indian title was one which did
not embarrass the company or call for any action on the part of the United States.
With reference to other tracts mentioned none of them were lands to which the
provisions referred to applied, for they were "reservations" and " appropriated" as
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such at thP <lat<' of tlJf' (lt•linitl:' location of the road and were not therefor<> "aefplire<l
in lw donation" hy thP company. They were exprPssly excepted from the donation
b~· tl1P thir(l sPrtion of the act, and were not, therefore, lauds to which the provisioa
u111ler eonsidrration, in any e\'cnt, applird.
Thf' Sionx ReserYation in Dakota existed by virtue of Yarious treaties, from an
early day to that of April ~9, 1868 (15 Stat., 635); the Crow Reservation in Montana
was made by treaty of May 7, 1868 (15 Stat., 650. See al~-<o ExPcntive orders, October
20, 187i, all(l May 8, 187u); the Cc.:enr d'Alene Reservation iu Idaho was made by
Executive order of Jnuc 14, 1876; tile Yakirua by treaty of June 9, 1855 (1:! Stat.r
p. 951), and the Pnyallnp by treaty of March 0, 1855 (10 Stat., 1132). They were all
reserved lands at the date of the definite location of the road, and excepted from the
grant and the undertaking of the "Cnited Statf's to <>xtinguish the title. They were
also "approlJriated" and therefOI'e excepted. (See vVillcox vs. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498.)
It thus appears that with reference to one of theAe tracts the road was completed
without any necessity for aid from the United States within the time required; and
that with reference to all the others, the United States has never been under any
obligation to extingui!:lh the Indian title at all.
But even if ~::~nch au olJligatiou existell, it is too clear for argument that it was th~
sole province of the UuiteJ. States to determine when and under what circumstance~
it should be discharged, consistently with public policy and the welfare of the Indian,;.
Whatever may be individual views as to the policy of extinguislling these titles and
the incidental effect upon tLe welf~Lre of the Iudiau!:l, it is entirely clear that Congress,
by unequivocal laugnage, reservetl to the United States exclusively thH rigb.t to detenuine that q nestion iu relation to these lauds . If she bas not determined that
thrse titles can now he extinguislle<l con!:listently with public policy antl the welfare
of the Indin111~, that elHls the controversy. Neither the company nor any one el~e can
complain.
The po~::~ition of the company upon this question amounts practically to a chtim th~tt
the.\ were entttlrd to the as!:listauee of the treaty and war making power of the U11i1;eu
Stat ... s whenever, in lmilding their road, thPy encountered opposition from tribes or
roving bands of In<lians. Iu other words, that Congress not only uouatetl them
48,000,000 acres of the public lauds, without limitation, restriction, or condition, JJnt
also gave them the use of the treat~ -making lJOWer and the Army whenever a roving
bnud of Indians interfer<>d with their work. Your committee decUne to adopt this
view of the cnsf', and, on tlw contrary, are clearly of the opinion that CongJ'f'SS had
no snch intent in the passage of the granting- act, and that no justification for ::mch a
claim can be found in its tt'rms.
Third. It is further claimetl that the United States has nut caused. the lauds along
the line of the road to be surveyed as required by the act, for want of wbicll surveys
"settlement is hindered an<l retarded, and the company is thereby prevt>nted from
selling or realizing a11y benefit from its unsurveyed lands."
Your committee are uuable to see, even if all this be true, how it in any way touches
the question of the tluty of the company to construct its line within the rf'qnirPd time.
But it is not trne that the United States is in default iu the matter. The proYisiou
of the act referred to is as follows:
"That the President of the United States shall cause the lands to be surveveu fol."
40 miles in width on both sides of the entire line of said road, after the genera·] route
shall be fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of saitl road.."
(Sec. 6.)
The question as to when the surve~·s should be ma<le, with reference to the con;;truction of the road, was left entirely to the discretion of the President. If be at any time
decided that further surveys were not re<Iuired by the construction of the road, or that
the surveys were prosecuted as fast as was necessary, then no right to further surveys
existed in tl1e company. The lands, as your committee are adviAed, were survesed up
to the time of the default in 1879 as fast as, in any reasonable judgment, was required,
and we are satisfied tllat no inconvenience, from any delay in the surveys, retarded or
prevented the completion of the roa,d.
Fourth. It i!:l further contt>uded that the grant is not now forfeitable hecanse of the
action of Congress in the passage of the act approved July 10, 1882 (22 R. Stat., 157).
The granting act contained two donations affecting the public lands: first, a g-rant
of" a right of way" through "public lands" (Sec. 21); second, the grant of lands
contained in Aection 3. The two grants are entirely separate and distinct, made
by two dift'Prent sections, and of two di1ferent estates. The former applied to all
lands legally described as "public," the latter only to certain odd sections of such
lauds not within named exceptions. Undf'r the former, the company had a right to
buil!l its road across any ofsnch public lauds, and for that purpose had the nse of an
ea<>ement in 200 feet on C'ach side of its track. Under the latter, it took in fee the
dc::-ignated sections. Jnne 25, 1881, the road was located over the Crow Indian
Reservation, already shown not to have been included in the granted lands.
Thereupon, August 22, 1881, a treaty or agreement was entered into between certain
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-special agents designated by the Secretary of the Interior on the one part and the
Crow Indians npon the other, which agreement, so far as pertinent to the present inquiry, is as follows :
·'Whereas by section one of an act of Congress approved July second, eighteen hundred and sixty. four, entit.led "An act granting lands to aid in the construction of a
railroad aud telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound, on the Pa.cific coast,
by the northern route (thirteenth Statutes at Large, page three hundred and sixtyfive), the Northern Pacific Railroad Company was authorized and empowered to lay
out, locate, construct, furnish, maintain, and enjoy a continuous railroad and telegraph line, with the appurtenances, namely: Beginning at a point on Lake Superior,
in the State of Minnesota or Wisconsin ; thence westerly by tbe most eli~ible railroad
route, as shall be determined by said company, within the t.-rritory of the United
States, on a bne north of the forty-fifth degree of latitude, to some point on Puget
Sound; and
"Whereas by section two of said act of Congress granted to said company the 1·ight
()j way for the construction of sa.i d railroad and telegraph line to the extent of two
hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass through the
public domain, including all necessary ground for station buildings, workshops, depots,
machine shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water stations; and
"Wher~as, by said section two, Congress provhlcd that the United States should
extinguish as rapidly as may be consistent with public policy and the welfare of the
Indians thfl Indian tit.Jes to all lands falling nuder the operation of this act and acquired in the donation to the road named in the act; and
"Whereas by treaty between the United States and the Crow Indians, concluded
at Fort Laramie, May seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and duly ratified
and proclaimed (fifteenth Statutes at Large, page six hundred and forty-nine), a district of country in the Territory of Montana was set apart as a reservation for the
absolute and undisturbed use and occupation of the said Indians; and
"Whereas there is no provision or stipulation in said treaty authorizing said company or recognizing its right to cmastruct its road through said reservation ; and
"Whereas the said company did, on the twenty-fifth day of June, eighteen hundred
and eighty-one, file in the Department of the Interior a map showing the definite location of its line of railroad from the one hundred and seventh degree of longitude
west fron Greenwich westwardly through said reservation and adjacent territory to
the western boundary to the said resPrve, as provided by said act of eighteen hunored and sixty-four, the company having first obtained the permission of the Secretary of the Interior to survey its line in said reservation; and
" Whereas the said company oesires to construct its line of railroad upon such designated route, and claims the right by virtue of said act so to do:
, "Now, therefore, in order to fulfill the obligations of the Government in the premises, this agreement · * * witnesseth:
''That for the consideration hereinafter mentioned the Crow tribe of Indians do
hereby surrender and relinquish to the United States all their right, title, and interest in and to a.ll that part of the Crow Reservation situate in th~ Territory of Montana and described as follows, namely:
"A strip of laud not exceeding 400 feet in width, that is to say, 200 feet on each side
of the line laid down on the map of definite location hereinbefore mentioned, whereever said line runs through said reservation between tbe one hundred and seventh
degree of longitude west of Greenwich on the east, and tbe mid-channel of the Big
Boulder River on the west, containing five tbousand three hundred and eighty-four
acres more or less. * * *
"It is furtber stipulated and agreed that the United States will not pPrmit the said
railroad company, its employes, or agents to trespass upon any part of the lands of
the Crow Indian Reservation not hereby relinquisbed, nor permit said company, its
employes, or agents to cut any timber, wood, or hay from tbe lands embraced in said
reservation."
July 10, 18tl2 (22 Stat., 157), Congress passed an act ratif) ing and confirming this
agreement.
The act first recited the agreement in extenso, and then provided as follows:
"SEc. 3. That the right of way over the land relinquished by said agreement to
the United States for the construction of said Northern Pacific Railroad, and tbe nse
of the several parcels of land so relinquished intended to ue used for depots, stations,
sidings, and so forth, for said railroad, are hereby granted to said Northern Pacific
Railroad Company, its successors, and assigns, for the uses and purposes in aid
agreement set forth."
It is claimed that by these proceedings the United States waived the breach of condition.
As hereinbefore stated relative to another branch of the case, this argument is plausible but not sound. It ignores entirely the fact to which we have adverted, viz, tLat
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the act contained two grants, one for tbe right of way and another in fee of the odd
sections, and overlooks the fact that these proceedings related sol.ely to the former.
The Crow treaty and act ratifying it are specifically limited to and operate only
upon the right of way. This is shown beyond all question by a bare inspection of
the statute. Neither the agreement nor the act contains a single word or expression
that could be tortured into a recognition o;f the continued existence of the land grant
or as a waiver of the forfeiture thereof.
Their only scope and operation is to extinguish the Indian title for the purpose
of making the right of way available. In this there is nothing whatever inconsistent with the idea of a forfeiture of the land grant and its declaratio!l at any time
by Congress.
The situation was anomalous. This munificent donation was then subject to forfeiture for ureach of the condition. A due regard for the rights of the Government
and its announced policy of dedicating the public lands for all time to come to actual
settlers under general laws, demanded an enforcement of the forfeiture. But the
<Jompany, pushing its line toward the Pacific, encountered difficulties at this point in
respect to its right of way, not as to its grant of land, for, as already shown, it had
no grant of lands on the reservation. No reasons of public policy demanded a forfeiture of its right elf way, granted by the act as a separate and distinct concession;
but, on the other hand, the most enlightened policy dictated its recognition. Hence
Congress and the execnuive branch of the Government extinguished the Indian title
as to the right of way, carefully limiting aU that was done to that one grant.. In
this, as before stated, there was nothing, in the judgment of your committee, inconistent with a clear and well-defined intent to insist upon the breach of condition as
to the grant of the odd sections in fee.
The Indian title was the mere right of occupancy; protected by treaty or reserv:ttion it remained the same; in either event the landt3 were public lands of the United
States. The United States did not grant these to the company, but expressly reserved
and exempted them from its donation. It could and did, however 1 give the company
a right of way through them. Such right it would always give in a proper case.
That the recognition of a former grant of that kind or even a new grant thereof can
he considered as a waiver of breach of another grant, of a sepaeate and distinct
~state, is, in the judgment of yonr committee, an untenable position. It would violate the obvious intent of Congret3s, as shown in all its legislation affecting the grant,
and leave this immense area of the public domain irrevocably consecrated to this
.corporation, without restriction or control even to accomplish the simplest object of
its creation. That Congress, by the act of 1882, intended any such result as that is
beyond the credence of your committee. \Ve think it was intended merely to confirm
the right of way, and that nothing in the proceedings taken for that purpose legally
operated as a waiver of the reserved rights of the United States as to the grant of
lands.
The doctrine of implied wai,·er invoked by the company bas its foundation in principles analogons to tho:->e of estoppel in pais. Tlw grantor, by virtue of something he
bas said or dour, is, according to the justice or right of the matter, prohibited from
asserting anything to the contrary. As betweel! individuals, occupying the position
of grantor and grantee, in a, deed upon condition subsequent, it iH estoppel, pure and
siwple, that enforces au implied waiv<>r of the breach; and, although estoppel cannot
lw pleaded against the Go\·ernrnent, for the sake of the argument we may admit that
the UnHed States, speaking and acting by its proper agents, might be placed in a
position where in justice and equity it, should not den;y what it has before asserted to
)le true. In every such case, however, the underlying principle is that of estoppel
between inllividnals. If the circumstances would uot, between individuals, amount
to an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, then a fortioTi the Government is nut
liOtllld.
Applying these critmia to the question noY'i' nuder consideration aucl it is entirely
clear that there was no wmver of the breach.
"An estoppel Ly matter in pais ffi<tY be detiued as au iudisputable admission, arising
from the circumstanee that the party claiming the benefit of it has, while acting in
good faith, been indnced, b)~ the voluntary intelligent action of the party against
whom it is alleged, to change his position." (Bigelow on Estoppel, 2 ed., p. :345.)
It is founded in the d.octrine of equity that if a representation he made to another,
who deals upon the faith of it, the former shall make the representation good if he
knew it to be fal ·e. (Bigelow on Est.oppel, p. 431; Evans vs. Bicknall, 6 Ves., 174, 182;
Slim 1•s. Concher, 1 De G., :F. & .T., 518; Lee vs. Monroe, 7 Ch., 366.)
To establish it, it is necessary to show uot only the fact of a misrepresent:,ltion or
coneealment, but also that it was material to the interests of the part.y and actually
misled him. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 4:31, 1 Story, Eq. Jur., par. 191.)
All the following elements must be present in any transaction in order to create au
e;,toppel by conduct:
l. Misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.
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2. The repre8eutation must have been made with knowledge of the facts.
3. The party claiming the estoppel must have been ignorant of the fact.
4. The misrepresentation must have been made with intent that the other party
should act upon it.
5. The party claiming, must have been induced to act upon it. (Bigelow on Estoppel p. 437.)
Hence, as a general rule, fraud is necessary to the existence of an estoppel by conduct. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 467.)
In general, where there is nothing to show that a representation was intended to be
acted upon as a statement of the truth or that it was tantamount to a promise or agreement, amounting to an undertaking to respond in case of its falsity, the party is not
estopped. (Bigelow on Estoppel, p. 486; Danforth VB. Adams, 29 Conn., 107; Farist's
appeal, 39 Conn., 150; McAdams vB. Hawes, _9 Bush, 15; Zuchtmann vs. Roberts, 109
Mass., 53; Kerhl VB. Jersey City, 8 C. E. Green, 84; Muller VB. Ponoir, 55 N.Y., 325;.
Davis t'B. Smith, 4:3 Vt., 269.)
And unless such a misrepresentation is in fact exclusively acted upon so that the
position of the party is changed as to his ml\terial interests, there can be no estoppel.
(Bigelow on Estoppel, pp. 49.2, 493; Howard VB. Huoson, 2 El. & B., 1; McCance VB. L.
& N. W. R. R. Co., 7 Hurl. & N., 477; Schmaltz VB. Avery, 16 Q. B., 655; Boker VB.
Johnston, 21 Mich., 3l9-:345.)
Now, there was absolutely no misrepresentation whatever of any fact, material or
immateri[~l, on the part of the Unitefl States; there was no intention to have the company do or omit to do anything whatever on account Qf any representations, false or
true; there was no action whatever by the company induced by or founded upon any
such representation; and the company has never in any respect changed its position
to its prejudice.
•
Not one of the prerequisites of an estoppel by comlnct is to be found m the entire
transaction.
What was there in the transact,ion amounting to a fraud upon the company, or a
promise amounting to an undertaking to make good any representation f 'Vhat bas
the company done to change its position'? How has it been prejudiced'?
One general rule can be deduced from all the authorities, viz, that unless one party
to the transaction intends to make.some representation or extend some assurance and
the other party to the transaction so understands, accepts, and acts, to his prejudice,
then there is no estoppel. Your committee are entirely satisfied that in this transaction
no such intention as waiving the breach of condition existed in the mind of Congress;
that no such understanding of the position of Congress was entertained by the company; and, that instead. of doing anything to their prejudice in consequence of such
proceedings, the company ol*tined new privileges and rights of great value. Under
the very act which they now say estops the United States they lost nothing; did no
act in consequence that prejudiced them in the least; and, on the. other hand, secured
the right of way across the reservation. It is thus clear that, treated even from the
standpoint of an estoppel, there was no waiver of the breach of condition.
To conclude, we refer to the following principles and authorities showing that mere
indulgence or silence cannot be construed into a waiver of a breach of condition.
(Gray VB. Blanchard, tl Pickering, 284, 292; Washburn, section 19.) Laches cannot be
imputed to the Government or its officers (7 Otto, 584), and especially "in a representative Government where the people do not and cannot act in a body, where their
· power is delegated to others, and must be exercised, if at all." (8 Otto, 489; to same
effect, see 9 Wheaton, 720; 11 Wheaton, 184; 4 McLean, 567; 5 McLean, 133; 1 Peters,
318 ; 8 Wallace, 269-27 4 ; 5 Otto, 316.)

VIE"rs OF THE

~fLNORITY.

I desire to add a few words to the foregoing in respect to m."T owu iudividual views upon one of the legal propositions argued by the majority of the committee since the preparation of the report to the Fortyeig·htb Congress b~7 the Public Lanus Committee. I have looked ,·omewbat further i11to the precise nature of the grant made by Congrei'~ to
this company, and I am by no means clear that said grant was one in
prccsenti upon condition subsequent. On the contrary there is much to
be said in favor of the proposition that the same is uot a present grant,
but is oue upon condition precedent, and that the legal title still remains in tb(:l United States Government. lu l':upport of this contention I mig·ht cite the case of the United States agaiust Childersl reported in 8th Sawyer, U. S. Circuit Reports, uiuth circuit,
The Public Lauds Committee, in the reports heretofore made to the
House of Hepresentatives upon the various land-forfeiture bil1s that
haYe be(•n submitted to it, has uniformly taken the position that the
grant is one in praesenti and upon condition subsequeut. I do not care
at the present time to Puter into a discussion of that question. To my
mind there is a wide distinction between the language employed iu this
act aud the one employed in the grant of June 3, 1856 (11 Stats., p. ~0),
which was the act under consideration in the case of Shulenberg against
Harriman (~1 vVallace, p. 44), where-in that act was held to be a present
grant. The language of that act, which was a grant to the State of
Wisconsin, was "that there be and is hereby granted." which of itself
was evideutly intended to operate as an alienation of the fee of the prQperty. This is quite plain from the fact that in the vVisconsin act there
is no provision for the issuance of patents to the lauds, nor are there
any words which could be construed to restrain or limit the operation
of the words of the present grant; but in the Northern Pacific graut,
while the words "there be aud is hereby granted" are used, sectiuu 4:
of the act proYides for the conveyance of tlle lands as each section of
25 miles of the road is contructed and accepted by the grantor, and
then there is a subsequent provision for the issuance of patent. The
peculiarity of this language is quite sufficient in my judgment upon
which to base a Yery persuasive argument to the effect that it was not
intended that the i>resent title to the lands in this grant. should pass
until after the issuauce of -patent.
In Uice t'S. Railway Company (1 Black, page 358) the question was
couside'red as to the e:ffect of an act donating lands to the Territory of
Minnesota to aid in the construction of a raHway iu wllich the wor<ls
"there is hereby granted'' are used. TlJere was a subsequeut provision
for the issuance of patent upon the completion of 20-mile section of the
road. The court there held tllat the preseut title to the lands did uot
pass until the completion and acceptance of the road and the issuance
of patent. However, I do not propose to enter into any further discussion on this subject, but simply place upon record these few observations in order that the fact of my making this report for the committee
may not be construed as acquiescence of the soundness of the proposition that the grant under cousideratiou is one in ]Jrcesenti.
BARCLAY HENLEY.
(13)

Mr. STRAIT, from the Committee on the Public Lands, snbmitted the
following

VIEWR OF THE MINORITY:
The undersigned, members of the Committee on Public Lands, dissent
from the report made by the majority of said committee on the bill (H.
R. 147) to forfeit certain lands granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad
Company.
Inasmuch as our examination of the facts and our view of the law
have led us to the same general conclusions reached by the minority of
the Committee on Public Lands in the Forty-eighth Congress on a bill
of similar import, we adopt as our owu, in the maiu, the views then
submitted by said minority, with some changes in the figures, to suit
the changed condition of affairs since that report was prepared.
Said minority report is as follows :
The bill declares the grant of land approved July 2, 1864, by the GoveromPnt of the
United States to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, forfeited as to ~Lll of said
grant except the lands coterminons with that portion of the railroad which had been
constructed on and prior to July 4, 1tl79; i. e., it declares forfeited all of said lands
west of the Missouri River, except a part of the Western Oregon division.
During the late war commnnication between the Government authorities at Washington and the people of t.h.e Pacific slope was, owing ~o the state of the country which
then existed, the great distance to be traveled, and the intervention of numerous
hostile Indian tribes, almost impossible. It bas been said with much truth that but
for the regular trips to California by the overland stage line the credit of the Government would have sunk out of sight. But the energy of IIalliday, who, to avoid the
!IHli:ms, found for his coaches an open prairie route 300 or 400 miles south of the direct
and usual line of travel, brought through large amounts of gold and silver which
could not be risked by sea, in consequence of the danger of capture by Confederate
pri-vateers.
This so forcibly illustrated the necessity for a transcontinental railway and telegraph line, to place the East a"!ld seat of Government in closer communication with
the rich gold-bearing Pacific coast, that on July 1, 18G2, au act was passed by Congress providing for the construction of a railroad from the Missouri River to the Pacific
Ocean, which resulted in the building of the Union and Central line. 'rhis, like every
other wise and great act of statemanship, excited a spirit of emulation, at all times
liable to abuse and often dangerous, which culminated in chartering and subsidizing
three other Pacific railroads, with numerous and extensive connections.
Tl!e Northern Pacific was the next in order of time, and ~bile no such necessity
existed for its construction as influenced the chartering of the Union and Central, yet
there were considerations of no small moment in its favor as well as against it. The
country it was to traverse was-the greater part of it-barren mountains, bleak
prairies, or a wilderness inhabited by ·wild and hostile Indians, whose murderous incursions and depredations for hnndreds of miles eastward, upon white frontier settlers, cost the Government annually a large amount of money to keep a sufficient
force of troops to repel and pnnish thf' marauders. Besides, the building of the road
from Lake Superior to Puget Sound would add to the already vast resources of the
country untold mineral and agricultural wealth. The road would increase immigration from the Old World, a very desirable thing at tha.t day, however questwnable
the policy now. Two or three generations hence, all the lands of America will be demanded for Americans.
The war was still flagrant and the minds of the people then controlliug the Government highly inflamed agairst Great Britaiu on account of the sympathy there manifested for the Southern Confederacy and nowhere within Her Majesty's dominions
more than in the Canadas. Lake Superior, at their doors, is a great inland sea surrounded by prosperous cities and varied industries. Puget Sound, likewise on or near
the dividing line, is the finest harbor on the Pacific coast, not excepting San Francisco and San Diego. It was, therefore, at the time the Northern Pacific Company
(14)
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was chartered and tbe grant of land made, but a just anticipation of and strategicmovement against Great Britain both for purposes of war and commerce. A verification in part of these apprehensions is now found in the Canadian Pacitic Railroad 7
more than 700 miles of which is already constructed.
Ou the other hand, thtJ early termination of the war took out of it the national necessity for chartering the company and making the grant, and the subsequent extension, instead of repealing the ~rant before any work was done, was perhaps nnwise 7
as it gave an impetus to a sentiment, generated by one great and popular act, which
soon grew into such a craze that nearly 20,000,000 of acres of the pnulic domain were
given to these soulless corporations upon which to grow fat, in~:~olent, and regardless
of the rights of the common people. 'fhe policy went to itA utmost verg~, and now
turns back upon itself. At last the danget· of land monopoly is seen; the people in
many instance;~ appeal to tlte Government for relief from corporation power and oppi·ession. Their repreAentatives are not nnmindful of their complaints.
Now, the great question for statesmen to solve is, "What shall be done f" Shall we
follow the beckoniugs of" t.he blunt monster with uncounted heads, the self-discordant waviug multitude," over tlle brink antl into the billows of confiscation and communism, or shall we, like philosophers, if not as statesmen, make the most of a batl
bargain by faithfully adhering to it and the law. which should be the master of us all t
Give a patient hearing to all, decide impartially, and legislate accordingly. \Ve think
the latter course preferable, and herein endeavor to follow it. We cannot. if we
would, dig up yesterday. And the good faith of the Government to all of its citizens
must be maintained.
The enthusiasm and impatience of American character were displayed in section 8
of the granting act, which prescribed July 4, 1876-the ceniennial ye::tr-only twelve
yean~, for the construction of a railroad :2_,200 miles long, over impassable mountains~
across difficult and treacherous rivers, through a country inhabited only by savagt>s.
ContrarJ to legislative expectation, grPat difficulty was enconHtered in rai~:~ing sufficient money to uegin the construction, and by various enactments the time to begin
the work was extended to July, 1l:l70, and the time finally fixed for the completion of
the wllole road was July 4, 1879, a period of only seven years. The company was
required to construct 100 miles per anmun as the minimum after the first two years;
yet it will be seen that the construction mnst have averag~d over 300 miles a year to
have been completed within the time allowed.
The company began work and constructed four hundred and twenty-five ( 425) miles
of road to the Missouri River by 1tl73, when the financial panic set in, anti the company was unable to proceed furtller until after July 4. 1879. The old company utterly
failed in 1875, and a new one had to be organized before the work could be resumed.
The new or reorganized company have constructed their saiu road to \Vallula Junction, 214 miles east of Portland; also its road from Portland to Puget Sound, a distance of 14G miles, and about 1J7 miles on the Cascade branch, aggregating something over 2,000 miles of completed road, all of which have been mspected and accepted by commissioners appointed by the President, under the fourth section of the
granting act. Fourteen years have not elapsed since the construction was begun;:
the company have, therefore, averaged about 140 miles per annum, which we think
evidences a commendable effort and earnest.ness to complete the road, considering the
difticulties encountered, which are hereinafter further set forth.
The sole ground upon which the forfeiture is claimed by the majority is that the
whole road was not completed by July 4, ltl79.
Now, we invite attention to the character of tbe act approved Jnly 2, 18fJ4, which
constitutes the charter, franchise, or contract of the company, as well as the law of
the case. The thinl section grants to the company a present estate in these words:
"That there be, and hereby is, granted to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company,
its successors and assign~, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said railroad
and telegraph line to the Pacific coast, and to secure the safe and speedy transportation of the mails, troops, munitions of war, and public stores over the route of said
line of railway, every alternate section of publie land, not mineral, designated by odd
numbers, to tlle amount of twenty alternate sections per mi.le, on each side of such
railroad line, as said company may adopt, tllrough the Territories of the United States,
and ten alternate sections of land per mile on each side of said railroad when~ver it
passes through any State." * * *
This language shows that the grant passed the title to the lands to the company.
It shows, too, very largely the consideration which induced it. The majority of the
committee claim, however, that the eighth section made the grant an estate on condition subsequent, for a breach of which a forfeiture may be asserted. That section
is in these words, to wit :
"SEC. 8. That each and every grant, right, and privilege herein are so made and given
to and accepted by said Nortllern Pacific Railroad Company, upon and subject to the
following conditions, namely: That the said company shall commence the work on said
road within two years from the approval of this act by the President, and shall com-
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plete not less than :fifty miles per year after the second year, and shall construct, equip,
furnish, and complete the whole road by the fourth day of July, anno Domici eighteen hun(lred and seventy-six."
\Ve admit that this section standing alone would make it a grant in presenti with
conditions subsequent, for the breach of which the grautor would have a right to declare a forf, iture. · Bnt section 9 is in the following words:
"f'EC. 9. That the United States make the several comlitional grants herein. and
that the said Korthern Pacific Railroad Company accept, the same upon the further
condition that i£ the said company make any breach of the conditions hereof, and
allow the t-ame to continue for upward of one year, then, in such case, at any time
hereafter; the United States by its Congress may do any and all acts and things which
ruay be needful and necessar~r to insure a speedy completion of the said road."
Thf> majority of the committee treat the conditions expressed in this ninth section
as ueing for the benefit of the Government, notwithstanding the unambiguous language that the United States make the grants herein, and the company "accept the
same upon the further condition," &c.
It will be ol>served that. the acceptance by the company was also npon condition, viz,
that in case of breach one year ~:>hould be allowed to repair it, and if the company failed
to repair the breach of condition within the year, ''the United States, by its Congress,
may do any and all acts and things which may be needful aud necessary to insure the
opeedy completion of the said road." It does not say that the land shall revert. This
language was not employed meaninglessly. In all the previous grants of laud made by
Congress to aid in the construction of railroarls the condition was clearly set forth, as
well as the penalty for a breach and words of reverter or forfeiture conspicuously set
forth. They were therefore estates at the comm n law where the gr:.tutor might reenter for condition broken. (Shulingburg t•s. Harryman, 21st ·w allace, p. 44.)
But here, instead of the grantee accepting au estate of that character as tendered by
the act, dowu to and including the eighth section, the company placed a condition upon
its acceptance which, being agreed to, madt' it a part of the contract. It was expressi\'e
<>f the purpose of Congress to dedicate the lands granted, in any contingeucy and irrevocably, to insure the speedy completion of saitl road; and ~Ll though Congress may not
have snccePded in its purpose and which opens a field of discussion npon whi ch it is not
necessary for us to enter, it is, however, clear to the minds of the minority that the acceptance hy the company, upon its conditions, so changed the character of the eRtate
granted that it was not a common-law forfeitable estate for ureach of condition. An estate upon condition, certainly-but in lieu of the con<lition, the l>reach of which at the
<lommon law made the estate forfeitable, a statutory penalty or reservation is retained
by the grantor, which it may exercise in any manner consistent with the 1·eservations
set forth in said section 9 and in section 20 of said act.
A common-law estate upon condition subsequent, wherein aforfeituremaybedeclared
for breach of condition, must be one upun which the grantor has the right to enter as
soon as the breach occurs, and being in is reinvested with his :first estate. And if the
grantor accepts a stipulation that be will not, in case of breach, enter until after one
year ha been allowed the grantee to perform the condition, the estate becomes absolute,
and the gra.ntor is put to his action, or whatever other redress his contract gives him, for
to retake the estate by forfeiture he cannot. Aga.in, the estate granted is apportionaule,
and the doctrine of forfeiture, wherein the grantor receives l>ack or is reinvested of the
identical estate granted, is not applicable.
Just here we adopt the language of the Supreme Court in the sinking-fund cases in
respect to this grant: ''Neither is it to the purpose now to questiOn the wisdom or policy
of the new departure taken in the case of the gra.nt for the Northern Pacific Railroad.
In the determination of legal rights to permit present v iewR and opinions of the wi sdom
or unwisdom of the legislators who enacted the law to affect the jnd~ment wonld be
misleading and dangerous." If the con(litions r eferred to in sections 8 and 9 make the
land granted a forfeital>le estate, every other grant, right, mHl }_Jri vi lege conferred upon
the company-its corporate fran chi:ses-and ~tll its rights au(l pow!~rs arc in like manner
forfeitable tor 1Jreach of any of the conditions, for there is no <1 istinctiouma<le, expressed
or implied, in the act. If these are not forfeitable the lands cannot be. (Hug hes t•s.
The Northern Pacific Railroad Company and others, 18 Federal H.eportcr, lOG and 108.)
If, however, we concede, which we do not, that the grant was of an estate on coudition, for the breach of which a forfeiture could have l>een declared, does that fact jnstify
the report of the committee' \Ve hold that it does not, for the reason that, on wensettled principles, both of law and equity, the Government has waiv<'d the right of forfeiture, if it ever existed. The thing which remains with mul resides in the grantor of
an e~:>tate in prcesenti with condition sul>sequent is in no sense property or estate, and is
not the subject of sale or transfer; it is a thing in action dependent upon a contingency,
the happening of which, the breach of the condition, is necessary to raise it to the
dignity of a right; while the grantor takes an estate which he may sell or mortgage,
.and which will pass as an inheritance subject only to the condition. If, therefore.
the grantor does an act inconsistent with that right, while in either the iucohate or
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perfect state, it is thereby waived or lost. Mere silence or inaction when it is not the
duty of the gra.ntor to speak or act is not a bar, but eo converso, when condnct or silence is misleading. (Nicoll vs. New York and Erie Railroad Company, 12 N.Y. Rep.,
137; Marks vs. Marks, 10 Modern; Brooks vs. Martin, 43 Ala., 360.)
"We concerle that this great Government has the physical power to disregard th'3
right and to do anything it pleases, but such has never been its course in dealing
with its citizens, and so long as just men and enlightened statesmen control its councils and tribunals it never will be admiiJistered, in any of its departments, upon the
monarchical principle that, like the king, it can do no wrong, and is bound by no obligation but its own sovereign will. This, then, being a Government of law, it will
ever set a good example and bind the citizens more strongly to it by itself obeying
the law.
Now, wherein bas the Government of the Uniteu States, as grantor in this case,
waived or prevented the performance of the condition?
1. By the joint resolution of Congress, approved May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. at Large,
378), the Government, with a knowledge of the inability of the company to construct the road, and before any of it was constructeu, authorized it "to issue its
bonds to aid in the con truction and equipment of its road and to secure tbe same by
mortgage on its property and rights of property of all kinds and descriptions, real,
personal, and mixed, including its franchises as a corporation." Anu in the proviso
it declares:
That all lands hereby granted to said company which shall not be sold or disposed
of or remain subject to the mortgage by this act authorized, at the expiration of five
years after the completion of tne entire road, shall he subject to settlement and preemption like other lands at a price to be paill to said company not exceecling $~.50
per acre; an<l if the mortgage hereby anthorized stall at any time be enforced by
foreclosure or other legal proceeding, or the mortgaged lands hereby granted, or any
of them, be sold by the trustees to whom such mortgage may be executed, either at
its maturity or for any failure or default of said company under the terms thereof,
such lands shall be sold at public S(tle, at places within the States and Territo1'ies in which
they shall be situate, after not less than sixty days' p1·erious notice, in single sections or
subdivisions the1·ec>.f, to the highest and best bidder.
Under this authority there were $:30,000,000 of bonds sold and the proceeds used in
the construction of the road to the Missouri River, which were refunded in prderred
stock of the company; and in the extension of the road by the new or reorganized
company, $25,000 per mile of bonds have been issued and sold and t!Je procee(ls used
for pnrposes of construction and equipment. Thus more than 2,000 miles of roa.d
which have been completed, inspected, and accepted by the executive branch of the
Government, with the lands, have been place(l nuder first mortgagt>, aggregating
$50,000,000. Besides, they have issued and sold $18,000,000 of second-mortgage bonds,
making in all now outstanding in t.he hands of purchasers for value, about $6~,000,000.
These bonds are secured by a mortgage upon the property of the company, including
. the lauds. The sanction of the Government by the joirit resolution ~as inconsistent
with its right as grantor to afterwards declare a forfeiture, and the right was thereby
lost or suspevded. (Sheppard's Touchstone, 121; Fletcher t•s. Peck, 6 Crauch, 87,
135-137; McCravy vs. Remson, 19 Ala., 480.)
If we add to the above the :;:;:30,000,000 and accrued interest, in payment of which
preferred stock in the rcorganizNl company was taken, we have near one hundred
millions of indebtedness, secured by lien, legal and equitable, on the eornpany'A property and the land.
In the second sect.ion, Congress reserved to itself only the right to alter or amenll
and not to repeal the joint resolution, having due regard for the rights of the company and other patties, which means, of course, the bondholders. What right has
Congress to declare a forfeiture of these lands where the roads has been constructed f
To do so would be an act of bad faith bordering on repudiation. (Sheppard's Touchstone, 121; 95 U.S. Rep., 319; 6 Cranch, 135-1:37; 13 Gray, 239-253.)
If tbe forfeiture recommended by the committee is adopted, and their bill passed,
it will take from the company the lands granted coterminous with nearly 1,500 miles
of constructed road; and the grantor (the United States) will not be reinveRted with
the title of its former estate, which was a wilderness filled with savages, but will be
reinvested with title to its lands increased in value tenfohl, a great line of railway
through them, and an intelligent white population instead of the savages. And thes'e
are but a part of the absurd consequences to which the doctrine of the committee
would lead us.
2. The grantor st\pulated, in section 6 of the charter, that as soon as the general
route was fixed, and as fast as may be required by the construction of said railroad
the President of the United States shall cause the lands to be surveyed, &c. ; whil~
section 4 declares "that whenever the ,. ~ " company shall have twenty-five
consecutive miles of said roa<;t ,.
" ready for the service," &c., the Presiclen
should appoint commissioners to inspect the same, and if they report faYorably, tha
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thereupon patents to land coterminous with the completed section should issue to
said company.
By a proviso to a clause in an appropriation bill approved July 15, 1870, Congress
prohibHed the issning of any patent to the company until they first paid to the Gov~rnmf'nt the cost of surveying and conveying the lands, a requirement which should
have been in the charter or grant, but which was not in it. It was, therefore, a new
burden imposed, and a violation of the contract. This occurred before there was any
"breach of conditions by' the company.
3. The grantor agreed to clear the right of way of Indians to enable the grantee to
construct its road. The grantor alone bad the power to do that. It was not done,
a.nd many of the surveying part,ies of the company were killed while endeavoring to
select a route for said road. What was the condition of the country through which
said road has subsequently been built prior to July, 1879f Let the commanding offivers of the United States Army tell. General Brisbin, commanding at Fort Keogh,
wrote from that place under elate of April 23, ll:li::l2, as follows:
"I mention these incidents to show you the condition of the Yellowstone country
:prior to 1877. It was so unsafe that not less than 1,000 armed men conld penetrate it
without suffering great risk. I advised the delay or abandonment of the survey for
the Northern Pacific Railroad because we had not sufficient men to make the country
safe. These brave fellows were several times attacked, aud I expected they would
be massacred."
General Gibbon, April 27, 181::!2, wrote:
"From 1870, wben I first went to Montana, till 1876, that whole region (between
:Mandan, Dak., and Bozeman, Mont.) was an almost unknown wilderness, where it
was not safe for any but large and well organized parties of white men to go. Euuineer parties had upon all occasions to be well protected with troops, and even after
the establishment of Forts Keogh and Cnster, in 1876-'77, the bauds of roving, hostile
Jndians rendered engineering operations along the line of the Northern Pacific Railway hazardous."
On same date General Terry, commanding the department, wrote from Fort Snelling:
"I came into command in this department in January, 1873. From that time up to
the beginning of 1877 it wohld have been impossible to make surveys in the valley of
the Yellowstone from the mouth of the river to the western part of the Crow Reservation, except under tho. protection of a very large escort of troops. That portion of
the- valley of which I have spoken has been constantly overrun by hostile Sioux, and
even with a powerful escort J3Urveys could have been prosecuted only at a very great
disadvantage."
Under such circumstances, we think that the company bas done all that a reasonaable Government could expect or require. The condition wa8 one which it was imyossible to perform within the time required. It was rendered impossible by the failure of the grantor to keep its part of the contract. There was therefore no breach of
condition. (2"Blackstone's Com. (by Cooley), 156, note 11; 4 Kent's Com., 129, 130; ·
Coke~s Ins., ~06b, 2209a; Sheppard's Touchstone, 133; United States vs. Maca, 18
Howard, p. 557; United States vs. Reading, 18 Howard, 1.)
4. In the second section of the granting act is found these words:
"The United States sball extinguish, as rapidly as may be consistent with public
policy and the welfare of the said Indians, the Indian titles to all lands falling under
the operation of this act and acquired in the donation of the road named in this bill."
When the engineers and construction men reached the Crow Reservation in Montana, they were stopped by the Indian agent and threatened witb the military force
if they entered, and thus they were halted until the treaty of 1882.
On the lOth day of July, 1882, while a bill was pending before Congress for the
iodeiture of the land granted to this company, the Congress passed an act (22 Stat.
L., p. 157) ratifying an agreement or treaty made with the Crow Indians, securing
from them the right of way through their reservation, and consisting of upwards
of 5,000 acres of laud, which said act declared "are hereb~7 granted to said Northern Pacific Railroad Company " * * for the uses and purposes in said agreement set forth." One of the uses set forth was "for the construction of said Northern Pacific Railroad." This was, in our opinion, au absolute waiver of the condition
:insisted on by the majority of the committee as cause for forfeiture. An act of forfeiture would be tantamount to an attempt at confiscat.ion. This act, if the grant
was an estate upon condition, dispensed with the ·condition and made the estate absolute. (Ludlow vs. N. Y. & Harlem River R. R. Co., 12 Barb.; Willard vs. Alcott, 2
N.H., 121; Andrewsvs. Lenter, 32Maine, 395; Chalkervs. Chalker, 1 Conn., 79; Hnme
n. Kent, 1 Ball & B., 554.) The company on the 19th day of Augui'lt, 11:!82, filed its
Mceptance in writing of the terms and conditions thereof, and on the 23d day of Anknst, 1882, paid to the Treasurer of the United States the $:25,000 required by section 3
of the said act of July 10, 1882.
If the bill reported by the majority becomes a law, it presents the anomaly of ·for-
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feiting the land granted to the greater portion of the road, not for the failure to build,
because the road is already built, but for the failure to build within the time prescribed
in the granting act. Who demands such forfeitures? Certainly not the people of the
United States, nor any very considerable portion of them, for if so-if it be feared
that this and other great corporations are to own so much of the lauds that the peovle cannot acquire them, why should not Congress, by law, limit to a much smaller
numher the eight hundred thousand immigrants, among whom are thousands of paupers and criminals, annually flocking to our shores in quest of homes? The questionahle policy of giving the public domain to homestead settlers, instead of retaining it
as a source of revenue, has existed now for more th1m twanty years, and bas opened
the flood-gates of immigration from all the world. The time is, we predict, rapidly
approaching when thi policy will be reversed.
But suppose you forfeit these lands and return them to the public domain, what
will you do with them? Give them to actual settlers is the response. Stimulate
foreign immigration still higher, as though au overcrowded population was a desirable thing for future generations to enjoy. The only demands, coming directly from
the people, for the forfeit.ure of the lands of the Northern Pacific Company, come from
a part only of the settlers within the limits of the grant. What is the probable cause T
Have all the Government lands heen taken up, and does this company exact such exorbitant prices for its la,nds as to render them ina,ccessihle? It was unfortunate that
the granting act did not put a limit on the price at which the company should sell,
but it did not. While that was not the fault of the company, but of Con~ress, it is
a privilege quite certam to be abused, if it has not already been. The offiCial report
of land sales made by the company up to Jnne 30, 1883, however, do not show that
they had exacted exorbitant or unreasonable prices for their lands. Four million
five hundred and thirty-nine thousand seven hundred and forty-three acres had been
sold for $15,f)93,156-au average of ttbout $3.43t per acre-a little less than $1 above
the GoYernment price for the f'ven-numbered sections within the limits of the grant.
Who knows what the public mind is? These great corporations are here, by their
agents and attorneys, using their influence against the whole policy of forfeitures on
the one hand, while upou tbe other are numerous shystert;, speculators, and lobbyists
in the guise of patriots and representatives of the people, urging Congress to forfeit
the lands granted to every railroad where there is the slightest pretext for it. Casting about us to discover the mainspring of action of t,his seemingly disinterested class,
we find m the eighteenth volume of Statutes at Large, page 519, an act of Congress
approved March 3, 1875, in these words:
"That where any actual settler who shall ha\'e paid for any lands situate within
the limits of any grant of lauds by Congress to aiel in the constrnction of any railroad,
the price of such lands being fixed by law at double minimum rates, a,ncl such railroad lands having been forfeited to the United States and res~ored to the public domain for failure to build such railroad, such person or persons shall have the right to
locate, on an~' unoccnpied lan(ls, au equal amount to their original entry, without
further cost, except such fees as are now provided by law in pre-emption ca,ses."
It is probable that a knowledge of the existence of this law is the cause of much of
the clamor that is raised a,long the line of this important road for a forfeiture of its
lauds. In that event every person who ha,s entered land at donble minimum anywhere within 20 llliles of the road on either side in the Territories or within 10 miles
on either side in the States through which tile road runs, as well as within those
limits where the road haiil not been constructed, would, if a forfeiture were declared
as recommended by the majority, htwe the right, nuder this law of 1875, "to locate,
on any unoccupiecl lan(l8, an equ(tl amou,nt to thl:'ir otiginal entry without jltrthet cost."
If those who would fall within this la,w sa.w proper they could "locate" upon any
unoccupied laud in any Sta,te or Territory of the United Sta,tes. This would give
rise to another class of la.ntl scrip and open another fiehl for specnhttion and rnthles
jobl>ery.
This law of 1 '75 was intended to apply to entries made at the double minimum of
82.50 per acre within the limits of withdrawal for [L projected railroad which is never
built and the lands forfeited ''for fail nrc to bnil(l" the road. The proposition of the
<.:ommittec i' to forfeit, "for failure to bnild" within the timo limited, the lanrls lying
alongside of 1,500 miles of road ·w hich has actually been built a.IHl is now in operation,
thereby bringiug the settlers all along tlutt line within the provisions of the LHv of
1875. In this, tb,tt law wonld receive a most odious anu unjust npplication. It offers
to donl>le each man's rea.! estate along the line of every laud-grant rai !road, if he ha
purcllase(l at the double minimum, and can iJl(Jnce Congress to declare a forfeiture.
Congress did not apprehend that the statute woul(l ever find such a field of operation,
for the simple rea::.OI_t tlutt no one in Congress then had eYer concen'eu the idea of declaring forfeited the lauds grantecl to .a railro[td company after it had actually built
Its road merely because it was not bnilt strictJJ· within the time limited in the grant.
Snch a course finds no warrant in the law, anrt leads to absurd consequences.
Keeping steadily in view the great object which the Government, in making the
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grant, intended to accompiisb, viz, the speedy constrnction of a transcontinental line
of railway from Lake Superior to Puget Sound, parallel with and north of the fortyfifr,h degree of north latitude, we find(1) That the eleventh section of the granting act declares that the railroad shall
be a post-route and military road for tbe use of the Government, and subject to such
regulations as Congress may impose restricting its charges for Government transportation .
(2) That the latter part of section 4 of the granting act, under a proviso, declares.
''That lands shall not he grante(l, under the provisious of this act, on account of an!}'
railroad, or pw·t the1·eoj, constructed at the date of tlze passage of this act." And a part
of the proviso to the fi.ftb section authorizes t,he company to form running connections.
with other companies on fair and equitable terms. The company have forrned a running connection-control and operate the railroad of the Oregon Rail way and Navigation Company from Wallula Junction to Portland, in the State of Oregon, a distance
of 214 miles, which forms an important link in the connection between the eastern
and w·estern portions of the Northern Pacific Railroad. We learn that the lease or
running arrangement is of a continuing or permanent character, at least for a great
period of time. Now w~ are of opinion that the compauy are not entitled to the lands
coterminous with the 214 miles of the Oregon Railway a,nd Na,·igation Company.
It is not the purpose or in tent of the granting act to give lands to tbe company on
account of a road const1·ucted, for th ,elanguage is that'' there be and hereby is g1·ante£l
to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, for the purpose of aiding in the constt·uction
of said railroad," &c.
The intent,iou of Congress is to be gathered from the entire act, and, in fact, from
all the legislatiOn upon the subject. In construing a legislative grant, no presumptions are to be indulged • against the grantor, as in the case of individuals. The
grantee must show his right in unambiguous terms. (Grand Lodge vs. Waddill, 36
Ala.; United States 1JS. Railroad Co., 1 Black.)
Can the Northern Pacific Company retain title to theRe lands along the Columbia.
River from vVallula Junction to Ps:Jrtlancl on account of a roacl which it found t,here
constructed and acqnired by lease' We rlo not uuderstand that the Nort.heru Pacific
is making any effort to construct their road to fill this gap. Indeed, there is no necessity for paralleling the line which they have leased. If the company is not entitled to hold these lands-and we hold they are not-it is the right and duty of the
United States to resume the title and restore them to the public domain. There is no
ground of forfeiture, for we have seen- that that character of estate was not granted.
But we hold that under the resenations of the 9th and 20th sections of the granting
act and the right of eminent domain as lord paramount, the Government of the United
States may, through its Congress and by statutory- enactment, resume the title to the
lands granted coterminous with the said leaEed road from Wallula Junction to Portland.
·

·Substantially, the object and purpose which Congress had in view in
making the grant to the Northern Pacific Railroad Company have been
attained, namely, "The construction of said railroad and telegraph line
to the Pacific coast, and the safe and speedy transportation of the mails,
troops, and munitions of war over the route of said railway" (section 2
o{ the act). The road is now complete from Lake Superior to Tacoma,
on the. Pacific Ocean, all of which has been built ·and equipped by said
company, save that portion from Wallula to Portland, through the Columbia River Valley, a distance of 214 miles, where there is a road owned
by the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, but now used by the
Northern Pacific Railway Uompauy under contract and arrangement
with the former company. 'l'he main line, therefore, is a continuous
road from the northern lakes to the Pacific Ocean .
On the Cascade branch, 50 miles eastwaJ.td from Tacoma and 87 miles
westward from Pasco, on the main line, have been completed, examined
by Government commissioners, accepted by the President; and 40 miles
more are now under construction in the Yakima Valley, which will soon
be finished and read~y for examination ; and when this is done there will
be left but 75~ miles, including the tunnel of 1.9 miles, to finish the Cascade branch. The contract for the construction of the tunnel has been
made and the work is progressing.
In consonance, therefore, with the facts and our views of the la~ and
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the equities of the case, we report the accompanying bill, and ask that
it be printed, as we will offer it as a substitute for the bill of the committee.
H. S. V .AN EATON.
H. B. STRAIT.
I. STEPHENSON.
A BILL to resume the title to a portion of the lands granted to theN"orthern Pacific Railroad Company,
and to repeal in part the granting act approved .July 2, 1864.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rem·esentatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, That in consequence of the failure of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company to construct its road from Wallula Junction to Portland, in the State
of Oregon, a distance of two hundred and fourteen miles, over which line the said
company have running connections with the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company, and have abandoned. the building of their own road between said points, the
United States resumes the title to the lands granted to said company coterminous
with said unfinished part of said road; and so much of the act making the grant of
lands to said Northern Pacific Railroad Company as applies between Wallula and
Portland is hereby repealed, and the said land is resumed as a part of the public domain.

c
H. Rep. 1226-3

